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Scientists in some fields are concerned that many, or even most, published results are
false. A high rate of false positives might arise accidentally, from shoddy research
practices. Or it might be the inevitable result of institutional incentives that reward
publication irrespective of veracity. Recent models and discussion of scientific culture
predict selection for false-positive publications, as research labs that publish more
positive findings out-compete more diligent labs. There is widespread debate about
how scientific practices should be modified to avoid this degeneration. Some analyses
suggest that “bad science” will persist even when labs are incentivized to undertake
replication studies, and penalized for publications that later fail to replicate. Here we
develop a framework for modelling the cultural evolution of research practices that
allows labs to expend effort on theory – enabling them, at a cost, to focus on hypotheses
that are more likely to be true on theoretical grounds. Theory restores the evolution
of high effort in laboratory practice, and it suppresses false-positive publications to a
technical minimum, even in the absence of replication. In fact, the mere ability choose
between two sets of hypotheses – one with greater chance of being correct than the
other – promotes better science than can be achieved by having effortless access to
the better set of hypotheses. Combining theory and replication can have a synergistic
effect in promoting good scientific methodology and reducing the rate of false positive
publications. Based on our analysis we propose four simple rules to promote good
science in the face of pressure to publish.
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
3.
00
92
8v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  2
 M
ar 
20
20
Introduction
Scientists are concerned about the state of science. There is ample evidence to suggest that in some
fields a large portion of reported results may be false (Kerr, 1998; Ioannidis, 2005; Simmons et al.,
2011; John et al., 2012; Simonsohn et al., 2014; Rahal et al., 2015; Begley and Ioannidis, 2015).
The quality and magnitude of empirical evidence for this concern varies across disciplines and is a
matter of debate (Munafo` et al., 2017). But there is widespread acceptance that “researcher degrees
of freedom” – such as flexibility in study design, measurement, and reporting – can lead to a high
rate of false-positive reports. The dominant view holds that, in some fields, a sizable portion of
published findings are false – a viewpoint publicized so widely that the lay person may reasonably
be suspicious of the scientific enterprise. To remedy this situation, there have been remarkable
efforts to fund and undertake large-scale replication studies to help identify errors in the literature
and understand how they arise from current scientific practice (Rahal et al., 2015; Klein et al., 2018;
Ebersole et al., 2016; Camerer et al., 2018). Among other approaches, such as pre-registration and
registered reports (Nosek et al., 2015; Begley and Ioannidis, 2015; Munafo` et al., 2017; Nosek et al.,
2018; Munafo` and Davey Smith, 2018), a balance between testing new hypotheses and replicating
published studies is now proscribed as a matter of course (Munafo` et al., 2017).
At the same time, models for the cultural evolution of scientific practice have suggested that
replication efforts will not suffice to arrest the inevitable trend towards increasing false-positive
rates driven by incentives to publish positive results (Smaldino and McElreath, 2016; Grimes et al.,
2018). Several authors have instead called for increased attention to theory as key to restoring
a healthy scientific practice (Smaldino and McElreath, 2016; Muthukrishna and Henrich, 2019;
Smaldino, 2019). Whether, or how, theory will actually promote good science – that is, reduce
the rate of false-positive reports – has not been studied in a formal framework. Moreover, models
of cultural evolution used to interrogate the value of replication have been investigated primarily
by simulation, without systematic mathematical analysis. Here we work to address both of these
outstanding issues in the meta-scientific literature.
There are two ways that theory can aid scientific inquiry. When a field of research is underpinned
by a well developed body of theory, the community of scientists can focus on those hypotheses that
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are more important or have a greater prior chance of being correct. That is, theory can give
all researchers easier access to stronger hypotheses. At the same time, even in fields where a
theoretical framework is not yet well developed or widely accepted, an individual lab that expends
effort to model the system they are researching will generate stronger hypotheses by clarifying and
quantifying their intuitions and by weeding out unlikely or illogical hypotheses. We show that
this latter process – individual labs expending effort to select stronger hypotheses – has profound
consequences for the cultural evolution of scientific practice.
Our analysis generalizes earlier models for the evolution of scientific practice in response to
pressure to publish positive results. In particular, we extend earlier work by analyzing the possibility
that individual labs may expend effort on “theory” to improve the quality of the hypotheses they
choose to test. We analyze our model both mathematically and by simulation, showing that the
pressure to publish does not produce an inevitable decline in the quality of science provided effort
can be expended on theory. Rather, the system becomes bi-stable: it can support either high-quality
science (low rates of false-positive reports) aided by theory, or a decline towards low-quality science
and minimal effort. We quantify the basins of attraction towards these two different outcomes.
Then we show how interventions such as replication can facilitate the stability of good-science
equilibria. Finally we offer four simple rules, arising from our analysis, to promote good science in
the face of pressures to publish.
Model
Methods from cultural evolution can be applied to study the development of research practices
in response to institutional incentives (McElreath and Smaldino, 2015; Smaldino and McElreath,
2016; Grimes et al., 2018). This approach rests on the idea that competing research groups vary in
methodological traits that affect their success and that are “heritable” either by differential imita-
tion (Traulsen et al., 2006) or by differential production of students who then form their own labs,
adopting the practices of their mentors.
Efficacy and Effort: In order to study the natural selection of good science we adapt the model
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of Smaldino and McElreath (2016), which characterizes a research lab in terms of its “power” and
“effort”. Power and effort are treated as traits that can evolve in the population of labs via a pro-
cess of natural selection. Together these traits determine the rate at which a given lab generates
novel results for publication, which is a natural proxy for success (i.e. fitness) in the face of inter-lab
competition and the pressure to publish positive results.
Power in this context refers to the overall efficacy of the techniques a lab uses to identify
true associations, and thus it describes the entire process of testing a hypothesis and producing a
publication. Smaldino and McElreath (2016) note that increasing a lab’s power also increases its
rate of false positives, unless effort is exerted; and that increasing effort decreases the productivity
of a lab, because it takes longer to perform rigorous research.
In order to avoid confusion with the familiar concept of statistical power, we distinguish the
efficacy of a lab’s techniques, denoted V , from the actual statistical power with which the lab
correctly identifies true hypotheses, denoted P (+|T ). The statistical power of a lab is a function
of both the efficacy V and the effort e the lab puts into research (Figure 1). Following Smaldino
and McElreath (2016) we assume V ∈ [0, 1] and e ∈ [1,∞).
Under this model the process of producing a research paper proceeds as follows: (i) A lab
selects a hypothesis to test. (ii) If the hypothesis is in fact true, the lab identifies it as such with a
probability P (+|T ), which depends on the efficacy of the lab’s techniques and the effort exerted to
test the hypothesis. However, if the hypothesis is in fact false the lab mis-identifies it as true with
a probability P (+|F ), which again depends on the efficacy of the lab’s techniques and on the effort
they exert. (iii) If the hypothesis is labelled as true the work is published – that is, we assume that
only positive results are published (Smaldino and McElreath, 2016).
We assume that both true and false positive rates increase with a lab’s efficacy, V , and de-
crease with the lab’s effort, e. Effort decreases the rate of positive results because greater effort
is tantamount to a more conservative and rigorous approach to hypothesis testing. We choose the
following functional forms for the rates of true and false positives in terms of effort e and efficacy
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V ,
P (+|T ) = V
γ
× γe
1 + γ(e− 1)
P (+|F ) = V
θ
× 1 + (θ − 1)e
1 + (θ − V )(e− 1) . (1)
According to this formulation the true positive rate increases linearly with efficacy, but it declines
with effort i.e. as the lab becomes more conservative. The false positive rate is a convex increasing
function of efficacy (Smaldino, 2019), as more powerful techniques increase the chance of false
positives; but this can be counterbalanced by increasing effort. Just as in Smaldino and McElreath
(2016), increasing efficacy always increases publication rate, namely the rate of positive findings.
Our formulation for the rate of true and false positives generalizes the model of Smaldino
and McElreath (2016). The two formulations are identical in the limit θ = γ = 1. In general,
however, our formulation differs from Smaldino and McElreath (2016) in an important way: effort
expended to reduce false positives also has the effect of reducing true positives (for γ > 1), whereas
Smaldino and McElreath (2016) assumed the true positive rate is independent of effort. This more
general formulation avoids a pathology that was present in earlier work: the tautological limit of
P (+|T ) → 1 and P (+|F ) → 1 occurs only when efficacy is maximized (V → 1) and effort is
minimized (e → 1) under our model. This tautological limit corresponds to a situation where a
lab simply labels all hypotheses as true, and so it should occur only when a lab expends minimal
effort.
Our formulation also generalizes Smaldino and McElreath (2016) in the limit of maximum ef-
fort, e → ∞. This limit produces P (+|T ) → 1/γ and P (+|F ) → 1/θ, where the parameters 1/θ
and 1/γ define the technical limits of true and false positive discovery in a given field of research.
Hypothesis Selection: The rate at which a lab discovers positive results depends on the true
and false positive rates (Eq. 1) as well as the underlying probability that a hypothesis the lab
selects to test is true, P (T ). One way to imagine science is as a “grab bag” of hypotheses, each of
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which is true with a fixed probability b. We might imagine scientists as reaching into the bag, eyes
closed, and drawing a hypothesis which they then test in the manner described above (Smaldino
and McElreath, 2016).
For many labs though, hypothesis selection is itself a product of effort. This effort may consist
of broad engagement with the prior literature, which highlights some hypotheses as more plausible
than others based on consistency with established results across many fields of science. Alterna-
tively, it may consist of a lab can expending effort to produce models and theory, which enable the
production of systematic and self-consistent predictions that can be tested as empirical hypotheses.
In order to describe the process of putting effort into hypothesis selection we assume
P (T ) =
b0 + b1(e− 1)
e
(2)
where b0 is the baseline rate of true hypotheses under the “grab bag” model. According to this
formulation, effort e ≥ 1 expended on hypothesis selection increases the prior probability that a
selected hypothesis is true from the baseline rate b0 to a maximum value b1 > b0, achieved when
a lab puts maximum effort into the development of theory and engagement with prior literature
(Figure 1).
Publication and Replication: To study the impact of replication on the cultural evolution of
scientific practice, we assume that each lab chooses to replicate a published study at rate r, rather
than attempting to produce a novel study (Smaldino and McElreath, 2016). The outcome of each
replication attempt depends on the standing body of published literature and it is complicated
to describe analytically. However, replication can be analyzed concisely under the simplifying
assumption that labs all experience replication of their work at the same rate. We analyze this case
mathematically, and we later show via simulation that our analytic results are good approximations
even when this assumption is relaxed.
A lab produces novel results at a rate ρ,
ρ = (1− η log10(e))× (1− r)× (P (T )P (+|T ) + P (F )P (+|F )), (3)
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Figure 1: How can a lab do better science? Science can be made better in two basic ways: 1) A lab
can expend more effort, which means (all other things equal) that the lab selects a hypothesis with a higher
prior probability of being correct and that, at the same time, the lab is more conservative about testing the
hypothesis. 2) A lab can develop more effective methods, which means (all other things equal) that the rate
of positive results increases.
where the term (1−η log10(e)) describes the time it takes to produce a piece of research using effort
level e (Smaldino and McElreath, 2016). Similarly labs engage in replication studies at rate
φ = (1− η log10(e))× r (4)
where we assume that all replications are publishable regardless of outcome (Smaldino and McEl-
reath, 2016).
Adaptive Dynamics of Science: We can analyze the natural selection of good science via the
payoffs associated with publication of novel results and replication of previous results. We first
analyse the evolution of scientific practice under the simplifying assumptions of adaptive dynam-
ics. In this framework an infinite population of labs are assumed to use identical strategies, and
the success of a new strategy i, which differs slightly from the norm, is tested against the current
resident strategy (Mullon et al., 2016; Leimar, 2009). The expected fitness of a lab with a novel
strategy i, denoted w(ei, Vi, ri), is approximated by (see SI):
w(ei, Vi, ri) = ρiBN + φiBr +
1
2
ρiφ
l
(piBO+ − qiCO−) (5)
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where l is the ratio of published material in the corpus of the field to the number of active labs
(see SI). BN is the payoff for publishing a novel result, Br the payoff for publishing a replication
study, BO+ the payoff for having another lab successfully reproduce your work, and CO− the cost
of having another lab fail to reproduce your work. Here, pi and qi give the probability that a
replication attempt by another lab on a study produced by lab i is successful or unsuccessful
respectively (see SI section 1.1).
The equilibria of the adaptive dynamical system occur when the selection gradient is zero
∂w
∂ei
∣∣∣
ei=e
= 0
∂w
∂ri
∣∣∣
ri=r
= 0 (6)
Note that ∂w∂ei
∣∣∣
Vi=V
> 0 for all V , and so the system necessarily evolves to maximum methodological
efficacy, V = 1, as in the model of Smaldino and McElreath (2016). Eq. 6 cannot in general be
solved analytically (see SI section 1), but it can be systematically explored numerically.
Individual-based Simulations: In addition to mathematical analysis by adaptive dynamics,
we also perform Monte Carlo simulations in polymorphic, finite populations, where lab strategies
replicate according to a copying process (Traulsen et al., 2006). We assume that science is produced
according to Eqs. 1-4 and that replication can occur once for any study present in the corpus, which
has size L. Labs are assumed to become inactive when they adopt a new strategy, which may be
thought of as retirement of a senior professor and replacement by a new hire. When a new lab is
formed we assume that mutations perturb effort e, efficacy V , and replication rate r. Mutational
perturbations are drawn uniformly from [−0.01, 0.01], and mutations occur at rate µe, µV and µr
respectively (see SI for full details).
First we perform simulations in the limit γ = θ = 1, where our model coincides with Smaldino
and McElreath (2016). In this limit we can reproduce the findings of Smaldino (2019): bad science
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evolves in the absence of theory (SI Figure S5). Next we analyze the ability of theory, replication
and methodological efficacy to preserve good science.
Results
Theory produces good science: When a lab cannot improve hypothesis selection by effort, then
science will evolve to a state where labs simply label all novel hypotheses as true – that is, the
evolution of bad science (Smaldino and McElreath, 2016). As we show below, however, the mere
act of expending effort to find stronger hypotheses is sufficient to stabilize good science. We define
good science as an equilibrium that maintains a false positive rate close to the technical minimum,
P (+|F ) ∼ V/θ. Under our model this can occur only when effort is high (Eq. 1).
We model the act of expending effort to find stronger hypotheses via Eq. 2, where minimum
effort (e = 1) results in selection of a hypothesis with prior probability P (T ) = b0 and maximum
effort (e→∞) results in a hypothesis with prior probability P (T ) = b1 > b0. That is to say, a lab
can expend effort to identify stronger hypotheses – meaning those that have a higher probability
of being true.
Expending effort to find stronger hypotheses produces good science, whereas simply having
effortless access to stronger hypotheses does not (Figure 2). The figure shows the results of sim-
ulations in three different regimes: (i) only weak hypotheses available (b0 = b1 = 0.01) (ii) only
strong hypotheses available (b0 = b1 = 0.25) and (iii) choice, via effort, between weak and strong
hypotheses (b0 = 0.01 and b1 = 0.25). In the first two cases bad science evolves, with effort de-
clining to its minimum and true and false positive rates increasing to unity, which replicates the
simulation results of Smaldino and McElreath (2016). However in the third case, when effort can
be expended to select stronger hypotheses, we find something quite different. As labs evolve, ef-
fort increases from its initial value to a level that maintains a high true-positive rate and a low
false-positive rate – the evolution of good science. Note that expending effort on theory in order to
select strong hypotheses produces a good-science equilibrium even when effortless access to equally
strong hypotheses leads to bad science.
How does expending effort on hypothesis selection promote good science? Analysis of our
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Figure 2: The evolution of good science: We ran indiv dual-based simulations in which N = 100 labs
compete to publish positive results, in the absence of replication. In each panel we plot the trajectories of
efficacy V (dashed blue line), true positive rate P (+|T ) (solid blue line), false-positive rate P (+|F ) (red
line), and effort (e− 1)/e (green line). a) When only weak hypotheses are available (b0 = b1 = 0.01) efficacy
increases over time, but effort declines, so that the population evolves to a bad-science equilibrium. b) The
same is true when only strong hypotheses are available (b0 = b1 = 0.25). c) When effort can be put into
choosing between weak and strong hypotheses (b0 = 0.01 and b1 = 0.25) a stable, good-science equilibrium
emerges, and effort and efficacy both increase, leaving the false positive rate close to the technical minimum
P (+|F ) ∼ 1/θ. The figures show the mean trajectories over an ensemble of 103 replicate simulations. The
rate of publication for each lab was determined by Eqs. 1-3; mutations occurred to effort e and efficacy
V at rate µe = µV = 0.01. Mutational perturbations to efficacy were drawn uniformly from the range
[−0.01, 0.01], and effort was assumed to change by ±1 upon mutation. Cultural evolution occurred via a
copying process (see SI), payoffs were set at BN = 1, and θ = 25.
model by adaptive dynamics (Eqs. 5-6 and SI section 1) shows that when effort can be expended
to find stronger hypotheses, the system becomes bi-stable (Figure 3). The bad-science equilibrium
identified by Smaldino and McElreath (2016) always exists, but another equilibrium emerges that
features high effort and low false positives. For a broad range of parameters the basin of attraction
towards the good-science equilibrium is much larger than the basin of attraction towards the bad-
science equilibrium.
The reason why increasing effort can be advantageous once theory is introduced, is that greater
effort results in a greater probability of testing a true hypothesis in the first place, P (T ). Near
to the good-science equilibrium, decreasing effort tends to reduce the overall rate of publication,
because it makes hypotheses less likely to be true a priori; and the lab still puts effort into assessing
the veracity of each hypothesis, so that they end up identifying more hypotheses as false, thereby
reducing publication rate. This phenomenon is sufficient to stabilize good science.
The emergence of good science as a stable response to the pressure to publish depends on the
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Figure 3: Analysis of equillibria by adaptive dynamics. The figure shows equilibrium publication
strategies in a large population of labs, as a function of model parameters. Plotted in each panel are the
locations of the stable (blue) and unstable (red) equilibria as a function of either the technical minimum false
positive rate 1/θ (left column) or the maximum achievable hypothesis strength b1 (right column). For many
parameter choices the system is bi-stable, with a good-science equilibrium indicated by the blue line and
a bad-science equilibrium at minimum effort (e − 1)/e = 0. In the gray regions selection favors increasing
effort towards the good-science equilibrium; whereas in the white regions selection favors ever decreasing
effort towards to bad-science equilibrium. a) For b0 = 0.01 and b1 = 0.25 and without replication (r = 0),
stable good science requires a technical minimum true positive rate no greater than 1/θ = 0.08. b) With
better theory, meaning the possibility of stronger hypotheses b1 = 0.5, good science is stable with even lower
methodological efficacy (e.g. 1/θ > 0.1). c) Adding replication at a low rate (r = 0.01) enables good science
to be maintained for even larger values of 1/θ. Similar patterns occur when we fix 1/θ and vary b1 (right
column): increasing methodological efficacy allows good science to emerge even with weaker hypotheses
(panels d-e), and replication decreases the need for strong theory even further (panel f). Payoffs are set at
BN = 1, Br = 0.2, BO+ = 0.1 and CO− = 100 and l = 5.
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extent to which a field has developed along three major axes (Figure 3 and Figure S3). (i) A field
must have achieved a sufficient degree of methodological efficacy (1/θ sufficiently small). That is, if
low rates of false positives cannot possibly be achieved even through high effort, then good science
cannot be maintained. (ii) Labs must have sufficient ability to discriminate between strong and
weak hypotheses (b1 sufficiently larger than b0). That is, good science cannot be maintained if
a field does not yet have sufficient theory to allow labs the ability to select stronger hypotheses
through effort. (iii) Good science can be stabilized when labs undertake replication (r > 0), which
can help make up for weaker methodology (θ) or theory (b1), but this is not always guaranteed (see
SI)
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Replication can make good science easier: Theoretical and methodological development are
intrinsic characteristics of a field. While both tend to improve over time, they cannot be varied
exogenously. In contrast, the rate of replication can be increased or decreased exogenously by
introducing institutional incentives or policies that require replication (Munafo` et al., 2017). And
so much of the debate over how to promote good science has been focused on encouraging replication
and similar interventions (Munafo` et al., 2017; Munafo` and Davey Smith, 2018).
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Figure 4: Synergy between replication and theory. The figure shows results of individual-based
simulations for the evolution of scientific practice with and without replication. In the regime 1/θ = 0.04,
shown here, theory and replication are both required to produce good science, as predicted by mathematical
analysis by adaptive dynamics (Figure 3a). (a) In the absence of replication, both true (blue) and false (red)
positive rates increase to unity, and effort declines to a minimum (e− 1)/e = 0 (green). b) However, when
replication occurs at a rate r = 0.1, effort increases over time towards a good-science equilibrium in which
false positives are rare. All parameters are the same as in Figure 2c, except for θ. Replications are chosen
from a corpus of L = 105 novel studies, and each study is allowed to be replicated only once (see SI). Payoffs
are BN = 1, Br = 0.2, BO+ = 0.1 and CO− = 100.
Replication can help weed out bad science by re-testing published results and flagging the false
positives. By imposing a cost on labs who publish false positives, replication reduces the incentive
for labs to lazily label novel results as true without expending the effort to properly verify them.
However, previous models for the evolution of scientific practice have found that replication cannot
prevent the natural selection of bad science (Smaldino and McElreath, 2016). We too find that,
in the absence of theory to enable hypothesis selection, replication alone does not produce good
science (Figure 4). However we also find (Figures 3-4) that, in the presence of theory, replication
can both increase the basin of attraction of good science and interact synergistically with stronger
hypotheses and better methodology to stabilize good science. Figure 4 shows examples where
the introduction of replication can make the difference between the evolution of bad versus good
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science.
We can also analyze the co-evolution of effort and replication rate. Using the framework of
adaptive dynamics (Eqs. 5-6) we show that, when the cost for studies that fail to replicate is large
(CO−  1) both good- and bad-science equilibria persist, but replication is always lost (see SI
Section 1.2 and Figure S1). Individual-based simulations produce similar results: in combination
with theory replication evolves to low rates and good science is maintained, whereas without theory,
replication cannot help to prevent the natural selection of bad science (SI Section 2.4 and Figure
S4). Moreover, when replication occurs at a fixed rate and does not evolve, but is rather held in
place as a policy, it can dramatically expand the basin of attraction of good science (SI Section 1.4
and Figure S3).
Discussion
Scientific practice is amenable to scientific study. We have developed models of cultural evolution
(Smaldino and McElreath, 2016) to study how theory influences research effort and methodological
efficacy for labs under pressure to publish. The ability to expend theoretical effort on hypothesis
selection produces bi-stable dynamics: evolution will lead either to high-effort labs that publish
reports with few false positives (good science), or alternatively to minimal-effort labs that publish
results replete with false positives (bad science). Our mathematical analysis delineates which of
these equilibria will arise, in terms of the payoffs for publication, the field’s technical limits on true-
and false-positive discovery, the payoffs associated with replication efforts, and the extent to which
theory can improve hypothesis selection in the field.
Four rules for the natural selection of good science: Our analysis suggests four simple rules
to promote the evolution of good science, which offer both optimism and caution for researchers
concerned about the publication of false results.
1. Develop a robust theoretical framework. A theoretical framework that enables labs to
distinguish strong hypotheses from weak ones, at a cost, is sufficient to preserve good science.
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Science benefits from such a theoretical framework, in part because it takes effort to identify
stronger hypotheses.
2. Don’t rely on replication alone. Replication alone does not produce good science, but it
can interact synergistically with theory to stabilize good science.
3. Different fields have different needs. There is a trade-off between the methodological
efficacy, theoretical sophistication, and the rate of replication required to sustain good science.
A field that is more developed in one area can afford to be less developed in another, meaning
better methods can make up for mediocre theory, to a point (Smaldino, 2019).
4. Bad science is always a danger. Low-effort, attention-grabbing publication of any and
all hypotheses is likely to be a stable equilibrium in all fields.
Models of models: In our model for the evolution of scientific practice, increased effort makes
almost everything harder: research takes longer and a lab is more conservative when labelling a
hypothesis as true, both of which reduce the overall rate of publication. The only direct benefit
of effort lies in selecting stronger hypotheses. And yet this effect is often sufficient to induce a
qualitative change in the equilibrium outcome – namely, to stabilize good science in the face of
pressure to publish.
Like all models, ours is a simplification and abstraction of what is, in reality, an incredibly com-
plex process. The purpose of the model is to cut through the complexity whilst retaining the most
salient forces at play when scientists make decisions about what to study and by what methodol-
ogy and effort. The value of a mathematical or computational model over a verbal hypothesis is
that it allows systematic exploration of how these fundamental forces play out, without relying on
intuition alone (Smaldino, 2017).
To be truly useful, a model should tell us something that we did not know before we built it –
that is, the model need not be entirely stupid (Smaldino, 2017). In the context of scientific practice,
we have seen that theory must provide new information about what constitutes a strong versus
a weak hypothesis, in order to promote good science. A theoretical model whose output simply
recapitulates the assumptions that went into building it is tautological, and it does not grant us
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any additional ability to distinguish between strong and weak hypotheses; it is wasted effort that
does not help promote good science.
Our findings reinforce and justify the calls made by several authors for better theory, particularly
in the social sciences (Smaldino and McElreath, 2016; Muthukrishna and Henrich, 2019; Smaldino,
2019). We also offer some optimistic results for those who lament the pressure to publish as
corroding good science (Sarewitz, 2016; Rawat and Meena, 2014; Dinis-Oliveira and Magalha˜es,
2015; Kurt, 2018). Such concerns have a long history (Price, 1963) and an exponentially expanding
scientific literature (Bornmann and Mutz, 2015) poses profound challenges for researchers, even
if the rate of false-positive reports is low. Yet our results show that pressure to publish, and
competition between labs in general, can stimulate effort and produce excellent science provided the
theoretical and empirical tools in a field are sufficiently well developed. It is only when theoretical
tools are not yet developed, or go unused, that publication pressures create perverse incentives and
lead to the evolution of bad science.
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In this supplement we provide derivations for the equations in the main text, along with additional
simulation results to demonstrate the robustness of our findings to relaxation of model assumptions.
1 Adaptive dynamics model of publication
We analyze a model for the natural selection of scientific publication strategy under the framework
of adaptive dynamics Mullon et al. (2016); Leimar (2009). Within this framework we follow the
basic assumptions of Smaldino and McElreath (2016): a lab’s success is measured in terms of the
number of publications and (un)successful replications of their work by other labs. We assume that
labs “reproduce” by adopting the research strategies of other labs, based on their past success.
Under this framework we assume an infinite population of labs, each using the same resident
publication strategy, and we perform an invasion analysis to determine which resident strategies
are stable in the face of local “mutations” that perturb the resident research strategy. While the
assumptions of adaptive dynamics are unrealistic in several important ways, they nonetheless allow
us to systematically explore the qualitative behavior of the system, and our key finding from the
analysis – that competition to publish can produce good science when the role of theory in selecting
hypotheses is accounted for – holds when relaxation these simplifying assumptions in individual-
based simulations.
1.1 Lab life cycle
We consider a population of labs whose life cycle proceeds via a phase of publication followed by a
phase of selection and reproduction, in which the current population is replaced with a population
of new labs. This simplifying assumption allows us to assume that all labs are the same age during
the selection phase and ignore effects that arise due to older labs appearing more successful due to
having had more time to publish. We relax this assumption in our simulations and show that it
does not qualitatively alter our results.
As described in the main text, a lab i produces novel results at a rate
ρi = (1− η log10(ei))× (1− ri)× (Pi(T )Pi(+|T ) + Pi(F )Pi(+|F )), (1)
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The probability that the hypothesis being tested is true is given by
Pi(T ) =
b0 + b1(ei − 1)
ei
(2)
where Pi(F ) = 1− Pi(T ) and
Pi(+|T ) = Vi
γ
× γei
1 + γ(ei − 1)
Pi(+|F ) = Vi
θ
× 1 + (θ − 1)ei
1 + (θ − V )(ei − 1) . (3)
Labs produce replication studies at rate
φi = (1− η log10(ei))× ri (4)
and they reproduce the original finding of a study by lab j with probability
pij =
Pi(T )Pi(+|T )Pj(+|T ) + Pi(F )Pi(+|F )Pj(+|F )
Pi(T )Pi(+|T ) + Pi(F )Pi(+|F ) . (5)
while they produce a different finding to lab j with probability
qij =
Pi(T )Pi(+|T )(1− Pj(+|T )) + Pi(F )Pi(+|F )(1− Pj(+|F ))
Pi(T )Pi(+|T ) + Pi(F )Pi(+|F ) . (6)
We also define pi =
1
N−1
∑
j 6=i pij and qi =
1
N−1
∑
j 6=i qij , the probability of successful and un-
successful replication attempts for lab i by the rest of the population. We can now model the
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publication phase as a system of ODEs with xin(t) the number of novel results that have been
produced at time t by lab i and xir the number or replication studies published by lab i. We also
define zi(t) as the number of novel studies produced by lab i that have been replicated by other
labs at time t. Under these assumptions the dynamics of publication are as follows
dxin
dt
= ρi
dxir
dt
= φi
dzi
dt
=
∑
j 6=i
xin − zi
L
φj (7)
where L is the size of the corpus of published materials available for replication which is assumed
for simplicity to be fixed. Assuming a monomorphic population such that φj = φ, and setting the
number of publications at time t = 0 to zero, the distribution of publications for a lab i at time t
is given by
xin(t) = ρit
xir(t) = φit
zi(t) = (N − 1)
(
e−φt/L − 1 + φ
L
t
)
Lρi
φ
(8)
We assume that the lifespan of each lab is one time unit, such that the integral must be evaluated
at t = 1. This corresponds to a scenario in which there are many more publications in the corpus
of literature for a field than can be replicated in the lifetime of a lab. By Taylor expanding zi(t) in
terms of L−1 and neglecting terms O
(
L−2
)
and higher we recover
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xin = ρi
xir = φi
zi = (N − 1)1
2
φρi
L
+O
(
L−2
)
(9)
and taking the limit N →∞, L→∞ and L/N → l we recover
xin = ρi
xir = φi
zi =
1
2
φρi
l
(10)
1.2 Invasion analysis
Taking Eq. 10 as the publication distribution at the end of the publication cycle, we can then
describe the fitness of a lab i against a monomorphic background of competing labs, following
publication as
w(ei, Vi, ri) = ρiBN + φiBr +
1
2
ρiφ
l
(piBO+ − qiCO−) (11)
which we can write as
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w(ei, Vi, ri) =
(1− η log10(ei))× (1− ri)
[
Pi(T )Pi(+|T )
(
BN +
φ
2l
BO+P (+|T )− φ
2l
CO−(1− P (+|T ))
)
+
Pi(F )Pi(+|F )
(
BN +
φ
2l
BO+P (+|F )− φ
2l
CO−(1− P (+|F ))
)]
+ (1− η log10(ei))× riBr
(12)
We can now compute the selection gradient for the system. From Eq. 3 we immediately see that
fitness is monotonically increasing in Vi thus we need only evaluate the gradient at w(ei, 1, ri). This
gives us
se =
∂w
∂ei
∣∣∣∣∣
ei=e,ri=r
= − ηe log[10]
[
(1− r)P (T )P (+|T )α+ (1− r)P (F )P (+|F )β + rBr
]
+
(1− η log10(e))× (1− r)
[
d(Pi(T )Pi(+|T ))
dei
α+ d(Pi(F )Pi(+|F ))dei β
]
(13)
sr =
∂w
∂ri
∣∣∣∣∣
ei=e,ri=r
= −(1− η log10(e))
[
P (T )P (+|T )α+ P (F )P (+|F )β
]
+ (1− η log10(e))Br
(14)
where
α =
(
BN +
φ
2l
BO+P (+|T )− φ
2l
CO−(1− P (+|T ))
)
β =
(
BN +
φ
2l
BO+P (+|F )− φ
2l
CO−(1− P (+|F ))
)
(15)
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with
d(Pi(T )Pi(+|T ))
dei
=
b1 − γb0
(1 + γ(ei − 1))2 (16)
and
d(Pi(F )Pi(+|F ))
dei
= − 1
1 + (θ − 1)(ei − 1)
1
θei
×[
(1 + (θ − 1)ei)(b1 − b0)
ei
+ (ei(1− b1) + (b1 − b0))
(
θ − 1
1 + (θ − 1)(ei − 1)
)]
.
(17)
From Eqs. 13-17 we can calculate the points at which the selection gradient vanishes, (eˆ, rˆ), which
satisfy:
η
eˆ log[10]
[(
b0 + b1(eˆ− 1)
eˆ
)(
eˆ
1 + γ(eˆ− 1)
)
α+
(
1− b0 + b1(eˆ− 1)
eˆ
)(
1 + (θ − 1)eˆ
θ(1 + (θ − V )(eˆ− 1))
)
β +
rˆ
1− rˆBr
]
=
(1− η log10(eˆ))×
[(
b1 − γb0
(1 + γ(eˆ− 1))2
)
α− 1
1 + (θ − 1)(eˆ− 1)
1
θeˆ
×
[
(1 + (θ − 1)eˆ)(b1 − b0)
eˆ
+ (eˆ(1− b1) + (b1 − b0))
(
θ − 1
1 + (θ − 1)(eˆ− 1)
)]
β
]
(18)
where
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rˆ =
Br−BN (Pˆ (T )Pˆ (+|T )−Pˆ (F )Pˆ (+|F ))
(BO+Pˆ (+|T )−CO−(1−Pˆ (+|T )))Pˆ (T )Pˆ (+|T )+(BO+Pˆ (+|F )−CO−(1−Pˆ (+|F )))Pˆ (F )Pˆ (+|F ) ×
2l
(1−η log10(eˆ)) .
(19)
Eqs. 18-19 cannot be solved analytically in general and in particular Eq. 18 can produce multiple
solutions in the physically relevant range. However we observe that the condition for any equilibrium
to be convergent stable under all mutation matrices is that the 2 × 2 Jacobian matrix J for the
system must have negative eigenvalues or, equivalently, be negative definite (Leimar, 2009) which
in turn implies that (J)rr =
∂sr
∂r < 0 must hold. This condition is satisfied only if
P (T )P (+|T )(BO+P (+|T )− CO−(1− P (+|T ))) +
P (F )P (+|F )(BO+P (+|F )− CO−(1− P (+|F ))) > 0. (20)
If we assume CO−  BO+, i.e. the penalties for publishing false results are very large, then Eq. 20 is
only satisfied in the limit P (+|T )→ 1 and P (+|F )→ 1 which is the bad-science equilibrium. Thus
under our model assumptions there are no points of zero selection gradient that are convergent
stable except close to the bad-science equilibrium. This is consistent with our numerical analysis
of the system (Figure S1), under which we find only unstable singular points. However this result
does not exclude the possibility that stable equilibria can arise at the boundaries of phase space.
1.3 Boundary behavior
Stable equilibria can arise at the boundary if the selection gradient perpendicular to the boundary
points towards it, and the selection gradient parallel to the boundary is zero. We now explore the
behavior of the system at the boundaries r = 0, r = 1, (e− 1)/e = 0 and (e− 1)/e = 1 beginning
with tje resident bad-science equilibrium of Smaldino and McElreath (2016) which corresponds to
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(e− 1)/e = r = 0.
Bad science (e = 1, r = 0): The bad-science equilibrium of Smaldino and McElreath (2016)
arises at (e = 1, r = 0). From Eqs. 13-14 the selection gradient at this point is
se(1, 0) = − η
e log[10]
BN − (1− η log10(e))×
[
b0(γ − 1) + (1− b0)(θ − 1)2/θ
]
BN
sr(1, 0) = −(1− η log10(e))(BN −Br)
(21)
which is always negative, indicating that the bad-science equilibrium is always a stable state of
the system provided the benefit of publishing a novel result is greater than that for publishing a
replication, BN ≥ Br.
Maximum replication (r = 1): When replication rate is at its maximum, r = 1, the selec-
tion gradient parallel to the boundary, calculated from Eq. 13, is given by
se(e, 1) = − η
e log[10]
Br (22)
which is always negative. Thus we need only evaluate the selection gradient perpendicular to the
boundary at (r = 1, e = 1) which, from Eq. 14 gives
sr(1, 1) = −
[
BN +BO+/l −Br
]
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which, under our assumption BN ≥ Br, is always negative. Thus there is no stable equilibrium
with maximum replication.
Minimum replication (r = 0): Finally we consider the behavior of the system when replica-
tion rate is minimized, r = 0. For Eqs. 13-14 we find selection gradient
se(e, 0) = − ηe log[10]
[
(P (T )P (+|T ) + P (F )P (+|F )
]
BN +
(1− η log10(e))×
[
d(Pi(T )Pi(+|T ))
dei
+ d(Pi(F )Pi(+|F ))dei
]
BN (23)
sr(e, 0) = −(1− η log10(e))
[
(P (T )P (+|T ) + P (F )P (+|F ))BN −Br
]
(24)
at the boundary, where Eq. 23 must be solved numerically as above. Eq. 24 is negative provided
(P (T )P (+|T ) + P (F )P (+|F ))BN > Br. From Eq. 16-17, (P (T )P (+|T ) + P (F )P (+|F )) is non-
monotonic in e and thus, depending on the solution to Eq. 23 and the choice of Br the equilibrium
may be either stable or unstable. Crucially this means that the addition of replication to the
evolutionary dynamics of the system may cause a stable, high-effort equilibrium to become unstable.
The resulting evolutionary trajectories of the system across a range of parameter are shown in
Figure S1 and the basin of attraction for the good- and bad-science equilibria in the absence of
replication are shown for different model parameters in Figure S2.
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Figure S1: Co-evolution of e and r Phase portraits in the regime of adaptive dynamics for a) high
benefits for replication, Br = 0.2 and a small corpus of literature l = 5 b) high benefits for replication,
Br = 0.2 and a large corpus of literature l = 50 c) no benefit for replication, Br = 0.0 and a small corpus
of literature l = 5 b) no benefit for replication, Br = 0.0 and a large corpus of literature l = 50. All
other parameters are chosen as in Figure 3. The good-science equilibrium consisting of high effort and zero
replication rates, always exists alongside the bad-science equilibrium at minimum effort and zero replication
rate. We see that high levels of replication can undermine good science and pull the system back to the
bad-science equilibrium . Both equilibria are marked with red dots. In all cases we assume that the costs
for failed replication is high, CO− = 100
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Figure S2: Analysis of equillibria by adaptive dynamics. The figure shows equilibrium publication
strategies in a large population of labs, as a function of model parameters. Plotted in each panel are the
locations of the stable (blue) and unstable (red) equilibria as a function of all five parameters of the system
without replication. For many parameter choices the system is bi-stable, with a good-science equilibrium
indicated by the blue line and a bad-science equilibrium at minimum effort (e − 1)/e = 0. In the gray
regions selection favors increasing effort towards the good-science equilibrium; whereas in the white regions
selection favors ever decreasing effort towards to bad-science equilibrium. a) Impact of hypothesis strength
b1 of the basin of attraction for good science. b) Impact of hypothesis strength b0. c) Impact of the technical
limit false-positive rate 1/theta. d) Impact of the technical limit true-positive rate 1/γ. e) Impact of the
production cost of science η. Payoffs are set at BN = 1, and l = 1. All other parameters are as in Figure 2
unless otherwise specified in the panel.
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1.4 Replication as a policy
So far we have studied replication as an evolving trait, which labs can choose to engage in as a
way to improve their success through publication. However replication of published research can,
in principle at least, be implemented as policy, in which a proportion r of all published studies are
replicated by an outside agency. To study replication as policy it is sufficient to set Br = 0 and
ri = 0 in Eq. 12. We then retrieve selection gradient
se =
∂w
∂ei
∣∣∣∣∣
ei=e
= − ηe log[10]
[
P (T )P (+|T )α+ P (F )P (+|F )β
]
+
(1− η log10(e))×
[
d(Pi(T )Pi(+|T ))
dei
α+ d(Pi(F )Pi(+|F ))dei β
]
(25)
where α and β given by Eq. 15 account for the amount of enforced replication under the policy. As
in previous examples, Eq. 25 must be solved numerically. Figure S3 shows the basin of attraction
for good and bad science as a function of replication rate r and literature size l. We see that more
stringent replication (arising from either higher rates of enforced replication, or a lower ratio of
literature to labs) results in a larger basin of attraction for good science.
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Figure S3: Replication as a policy under adaptive dynamics. The figure shows the same information
as in Figure S2 under a scenario where replication occurs at a fixed rate r and Br = 0. a) Impact of replication
rate on the basin of attraction for good science for a corpus size l = 5. b) Impact of corpus size l on the
basin of attraction for good science for a fixed replication rate r = 0.1. All other parameters are as in Figure
2.
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2 Individual-based simulations
We ran individual-based simulations, relaxing the assumptions of the adaptive dynamics model
described above to account for (i) variation in lab age and (ii) heterogeneity in lab publication
strategy (iii) a finite population of active labs. We treated effort e, efficacy V and replication
rate r as heritable, evolving traits. We ran ensembles of 103 replicate simulations to produce each
simulation figure and plotted the average trajectories over time. Further details of the simulation
setup are provided below.
2.1 Lab aging
Under the assumptions of adaptive dynamics the population of labs is infinite and the lab life cycle
ensures that all labs are the same age when natural selection occurs. These simplifying assumptions
are made for mathematical convenience but do not describe a particularly realistic case: in any
given field there is a wide range of labs of different ages, and the older a lab is, the more it has
published. This has consequences for the rate at which the lab experiences replication attempts
(as they have contributed more novel results to the corpus of results in their field) which in turn
has consequences for their fitness.
We assume that labs “die” when they copy another lab’s strategy (see below). Furthermore we
assume that the fitness of a lab is determined by the average payoff received due to novel publication
and replication over the lab lifetime.
2.2 Natural selection and the copying process
We assume that lab birth and death occurs via the copying process Traulsen et al. (2006) used to
study a process of cultural evolution via imitation. Under this model, we assume that a pair of
labs i and j are chosen at random, such that lab i chooses to adopt the strategy of lab j with a
probability piij where
piij =
1
1 + eσ(w¯i−w¯j)
(26)
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where w¯i is the average payoff to lab j during its lifetime. This birth-death process can be thought
of as a fixed population of labs who update their strategies, described by their methodological
efficacy V , effort e and replication rate r, when they see another lab doing better. This may be
thought of as occurring whenever an old lab is disbanded and replaced with a new lab in a university
or research institute. Alternatively it may be understood as occurring among a fixed population of
competing labs trying to gain an edge over one another.
2.3 Replication
Populations of competing labs are assumed to contribute to a corpus of literature of size L. When
choosing a study to replicate a lab chooses a study at random from the corpus. They attempt to
reproduce the study using the same level of methodological efficacy V and effort e as for testing a
novel hypothesis. After an attempt at reproduction the study is moved from the corpus of literature
available for replication.
As a result, a lab that has produced n papers with novel results has a study reproduced with
probability n/L when another lab decides to undertake a replication study. If the outcome of the
replicating labs study is positive, the replication is successful otherwise it is not. The corpus of
literature is always assumed to contain L novel papers available for replication - if all the papers
by currently active labs have been replicated we assume that the labs can still reproduce older
literature. Thus labs can in principle engage in replication at the maximum rate r = 1, although
this pathological case is not observed in simulations or in under the adaptive dynamics model,
except transiently (Figure S1).
2.4 Co-evolution of effort and replication
We explored the co-evolutionary dynamics of replication and effort via individual-based simulations
(Figure S4). In the absence of hypothesis choice only very low levels of replication emerged and, as
in Figure 2 and Figure 4 of the main text, effort evolved to the bad-science minimum. In contrast,
when hypothesis choice was allowed the good-science equilibrium was maintained and replication
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evolved steadily to around r = 0.1 (Figure S4b).
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Figure S4: Co-evolution of replication and effort. The figure shows results of individual-based
simulations for the co-evolution replication and effort. (a) In the absence of hypothesis choice, both true
(blue) and false (red) positive rates increase to unity, and effort declines to a minimum (e−1)/e = 0 (green),
while replication rate (purple) remains low. b) However, when hypothesis choice is allowed, effort increases
over time towards a good-science equilibrium in which false positives are rare, and replication evolves to a
modest rate. All parameters are the same as in Figure 2c. Replications are chosen from a corpus of L = 105
novel studies, and each study is allowed to be replicated only once (see SI). Payoffs are BN = 1, Br = 0.2,
BO+ = 0.1 and CO− = 100.
2.5 Limit of θ = γ = 1
Our model reproduces that of Smaldino and McElreath (2016) in the limit γ = θ = 1, and as
such our simulations in this limit should produce the same qualitative results. We ran simula-
tions in this limit without hypothesis choice and showed that, indeed, the bad-science equilibrium
quickly emerged (Figure S5a). When hypothesis choice was allowed (Figure S5b) the bad-science
equilibrium still evolved in this limit, since power P (+|T ) and false positive rate P (+|F ) are both
independent of effort under this model, once efficacy evolves to its maximum V = 1. This latter
result illustrates a pathology of the limit θ = γ = 1, under which bad science (true- and false-
positive rates equal to one) cannot be avoided, no matter how much effort a lab puts in, once
methodological efficacy reaches its maximum – a state of affairs that does not reflect reality in any
scientific field. However, when we separate out methodological efficacy from lab effort in identifying
positive results, and allow for the possibility that a diligent lab can, in principle, expend effort to
do good science (i.e. by setting γ > 1 and θ > 1), the effects of theory on stabilizing good science
become apparent, and both good- and bad-science equilibria emerge – a state of affairs that more
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accurately reflects what we see in scientific practice across fields.
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Figure S5: Simulations in the limit θ = γ = 1. This figure is the same as Figure S4 with the alteration
that the technical limits of false- and true-positives are set to θ = γ = 1. In this case both without (a) and
with (b) hypothesis choice, bad science evolves.
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